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                                             NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                       
                                 
                          No. 01-1679 
                                       
                                 
                   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      
                               v. 
                                 
                       GEMALLE L. WYNNE, 
                                 
                                                 Appellant. 
                                      
                                 
        On Appeal from the United States District Court 
                 for the District of New Jersey 
                     (D.C. No. 00-cr-00193) 
         District Judge:  Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky 
                                 
                                     
                                 
           Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                       December 11, 2001 
                                 
Before: BARRY and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM, District Judge. 
                                 
                   (Filed  January 24, 2002) 
                                 
                                     
                                 
                MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                     
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
      We discuss two questions in this appeal by Gemalle L. Wynne from a 
conviction 
and sentence. 
     Wynne first contends that the felon-in-possession statute is 
unconstitutional 
because the conduct it proscribes--the intrastate possession of a firearm-
-does not have a 
substantial effect upon interstate commerce, and thus does not constitute 
a valid exercise 
of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.  Specifically, Wynne 
contends 
that although we upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1) as 
a proper 
exercise of Congressional regulatory power under the Commerce Clause in 
United States 
v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996), that holding must be reconsidered 
in the wake 
of the Court's decisions in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000), and Jones v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).  We hold that this argument is now 
totally foreclosed 
by our recent decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d 
Cir. 2001), in 
which we rejected the identical contention.  
     His next contention hinges on the teachings of Florida v. J.L., 529 
U.S. 266 
(2000).  In J.L., the Court held that an anonymous tip that the defendant 
was carrying a 
gun was insufficient to justify a stop and frisk conducted by a police 
officer, and thus the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
      Wynne argues that neither the anonymous telephone call to the 911 
operator 
reporting the gunshots emanating from the area of Francine's bar, nor the 
shouted remark 
at the scene of the arrest that he had a gun, established reasonable 
suspicion to believe 
that Wynne was engaged in criminal conduct.   
     On its part, the government argues that the totality of circumstances 
confronting 
the police established reasonable suspicion.  The government refers 
specifically to the 
following circumstances:  1) Wynne had fled, though unprovoked, in 
response to the 
arrival of the police; 2) he had fled from a location at which gunshots 
had been fired 
moments earlier; 3) he was in a high crime area where guns were frequently 
fired; 4) he 
had refused repeated police commands to stop and show his hands; and 
finally 5) a 
bystander shouted in the presence of both police and Appellant that 
Appellant had a gun.   
     We are satisfied that the facts here bear a closer resemblance to 
those in Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) than to those in Florida v J.L.  In 
discussing the 
requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Wardlow Court 
explained: 
     [W]e have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a "high 
crime 
     area" among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry 
analysis . . . 
     In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence in an 
area of 
     heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion, but 
his 
 
     unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.  Our cases have also 
recognized  
     that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining  
     reasonable suspicion . . . Headlong flight--wherever it occurs--is 
the  
     consummate act of evasion:  It is not necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing,  
     but it is certainly suggestive of such.  In reviewing the propriety 
of an  
     officer's conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies 
dealing  
     with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot 
reasonably 
     demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers 
where  
     none exists.  Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be 
based  
     on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior . . . We 
     conclude [the officer] was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was  
     involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating 
further. 
 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-125. 
      
     The district court here determined that it was "undisputed that shots 
were fired and 
it is undisputed that shots are frequently fired in the City of Camden, 
and so the police 
were obviously responding to a shots fired call in a high crime area."  
App. at 193. 
Accordingly, we reject this argument as well.   
                            * * * * * 
     We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and 
conclude that 
no further discussion is necessary.  The judgment of the district court 
will be affirmed. 
                                        
TO THE CLERK: 
     Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
                              /s/ Ruggero J. Aldisert                                 
                                   Circuit Judge 
